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This paper challenges the conventional explanation for declining density of German employers 
associations. The dominant account asserts that German trade unions have taken advantage of 
increased globalization since the 1980s – which has made internationally active enterprises 
more vulnerable to production disruptions – to extract additional monopoly rents from 
multinational employers via aggressive collective bargaining. Small firms have responded to the 
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increased union pressures by avoiding membership employers associations, which has 
produced the density declines. Data, however, disconfirm the conventional explanation; 
compensation increases have actually become increasingly smaller over the decades. This 
paper presents an alternative explanation that is consistent with the data. We argue that it is the 
large product manufacturers rather than the trade unions that have greatly increased price 
pressures on parts suppliers, which has led to a disproportionate number of suppliers to quit 
employers associations. The paper also discusses these findings in light of the “varieties of 
capitalism” literature. It points out that this literature has depicted national models as too 
homogeneous. The decision of several German employers associations to offer different 
classes of membership represents an accentuation of variety within national varieties of 
capitalism. 




Employers associations rank among the most important institutions in the German econ-
omy. They have been instrumental in creating and preserving the famous postwar “social part-
nership” between German labor and management that has minimized industrial conflict and 
brought stability to German industrial relations. In particular, the high density of employers asso-
ciations in terms of employment has been crucial in extending the coverage of collective agree-
ments far beyond what trade unions acting alone could ever have accomplished. German em-
ployers associations have nonetheless been shrinking for two decades. In particular, the member-
ship rates of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have fallen off precipitously. Efforts to 
stem the deterioration have thus far proved unsuccessful. The decline has become so pronounced 
that the capacity of German employers associations to continue to play their traditional sta-
bilizing role has come into question. 
 
This article investigates the causes and implications of the decline of German employers 
associations. It challenges the conventional explanation for the decline. The conventional wisdom 
(e.g., Thelen and Wijnbergen 2003) is that employers associations have responded to the in-
creased sensitivity of their member firms to industrial action as a result of globalization by acqui-
escing to more generous collective bargaining agreements. Large firms have reacted to the rise in 
compensation by accelerating productivity growth. Small firms, however, have not been able to 
follow suit and substantial numbers of them have instead dropped out of the employers associa-
tions. Data do not substantiate the conventional depiction, however. Increases in compensation 
have actually become progressively smaller over the past twenty-five years, which breaks the 
conventional wisdom’s causal chain. 
 
The article presents an explanation that is consistent with the data. We concur with the 
conventional wisdom that the decline of employers associations in Germany is largely the result 
of a drop in the propensity of SMEs to belong to them. Our dispute is over the cause. We find that 
large firms have stayed in employers associations because these organizations continue to deliver 
the principal benefits of interest to them: industrial peace and regionwide contacts that preclude 
unions from extracting a premium wage from individual firms. Small enterprises, in contrast, 
have not been seeing the productivity increases that were their traditional payoff in the bargain. 
As a result, they have been dropping out of employers associations. 
 
The flight of SMEs has prompted some employers associations to experiment with restruc-
turing their organizations and even redefining their mission. The article concludes by examining 
the content, efficacy and implications of these efforts. 
 
 
2. Previous Research on German Employers Associations 
 
Before the 1990s, employers associations were “chronically unexplored” (Abromeit 1987: 
417) and “disproportionately disregarded” (Traxler 1985: 51) in academic literature. Much has 
changed since. Upheaval within the economies of numerous high-income countries highlighted 
the role of employers and their associations. Newer investigations of the formation of the welfare 
state and collective bargaining regimes during the twentieth century moved beyond simplistic 
one-sided analyses to “bring capital back in” to the picture in a much more nuanced and sophis-
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ticated fashion (e.g., Swenson 1989). Thelen and Wijnbergen (2003) identify two schools within 
this literature. The first argues that transnational economic integration is producing convergence 
around a deregulated neo-liberal “Anglo-Saxon” model (e.g., Friedman 2005, Katz and Darbi-
shire 1999, Ross and Martin 1999). This analysis sees little place in contemporary economies for 
institutions that have traditionally “mediated” markets, such as employers associations and trade 
unions. 
 
The second school asserts that stable market niches within the world economy and multi-
ple equilibria regarding institutional arrangements permit “varieties of capitalism” to coexist 
(e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001). For example, some countries configure themselves to focus on low-
end mass production, whereas others concentrate on making quality high-end products. High-
end producers maintain “coordinated market economies” (Soskice 1999), in which employers as-
sociations and other intermediary institutions play an active role mitigating market failures that 
must be resolved for this approach to pay off in practice (e.g., the under-provision of skills). Pro-
ponents of the “varieties of capitalism” approach claim that deepening globalization is far more 
likely to sharpen cross-national differences and shore up existing national models than to pro-
mote convergence, because the transnational integration of markets increases the number of via-
ble niches available for high-end production. 
 
 Most scholars of German political economy have shown considerable sympathy for the 
varieties of capitalism school (e.g., Fichter, Turner and Wever 2001; Schroeder 2000; and Traxler 
2004). Yet, others noted deterioration in the membership and density of German employers asso-
ciations that ultimately proved too large and persistent to dismiss (e.g., Silvia 1997). 
 
 Thelen and Wijnbergen (2003) have presented the most sophisticated analysis accounting 
for the membership decline in employers associations. As a result, their analysis has become the 
conventional wisdom. Thelen and Wijnbergen base their analysis on a case study of how Indus-
triegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall, Industrial Union of Metalworkers) was able to win a 1995 strike 
despite declining membership and Germany’s increased international economic integration. 
Along the way, they address “characteristic blind spots” in the varieties of capitalism approach, 
in particular, a tendency “to see all feedback as operating to sustain and reproduce existing sys-
tems” (p. 860). 
 
 Thelen and Wijnbergen argue that globalization splits the German employers’ camp in 
two: larger, export-oriented firms and smaller enterprises that serve primarily the domestic mar-
ket. Greater transnational economic integration renders the export-oriented firms more vulner-
able to economic disruption than they had been in the past. Their supply and sales chains have 
become considerably longer and they face formidable competition from foreign rivals both at 
home and abroad. Large, export-oriented firms are therefore far less willing to engage in indus-
trial conflict. The result, Thelen and Wijnbergen assert, is that the large firms have increasingly 
influenced the employers associations in their sectors, which negotiate wage agreements for most 
of the German economy, to accept hefty wage hikes in order to avoid shutdowns in production 
(pp. 868-70). 
 
 Thelen and Wijnbergen maintain that the larger and more sophisticated German firms 
responded to the acceleration in compensation costs by undertaking a thoroughgoing restruc-
turing to ratchet up productivity growth. Smaller firms, in contrast, do not have the capacity to 
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do the same because they lack the resources and economies of scale to restructure. This, accord-
ing to Thelen and Wijnbergen, has produced the vicious cycle within German employers associa-
tions. SMEs that cannot adjust shirk membership in employers associations. The firms remaining 
in the association become increasingly unrepresentative. They are both disproportionately con-
flict adverse and cost insensitive. Consequently, German employers associations have become 
ever more reluctant to engage in industrial action. After each new expensive wage settlement, a 
fresh wave of cost-sensitive firms to quit their associations (pp. 870-71). 
 
The strength of Thelen and Wijnbergen and other work by Thelen (e.g., Thelen 2000 and 
Thelen and Kume 1999) is the analytics. They deploy stylized institutionalist arguments, at times 
supplemented with a rational-choice approach, to elucidate their claims. The weakness, however, 
is the empirics. This approach provides us with no systematic evidence. In some instances, single 
anecdotes are provided that are not representative of the longer trend (e.g., wage developments). 
In other cases, no evidence at all is given (e.g., productivity trends). Other scholars making simi-
lar arguments share this shortcoming (e.g., Streeck and Hassel 2003/2004). 
 
This failure to use data is in part understandable. Employers associations are not mass or-
ganizations. They tend to keep organizational data and internal communications confidential. 
Still, there are relevant aggregate data available on compensation and productivity that even the 
more sophisticated studies of German employers associations have not used. This article takes 
the extra step of employing available data to test the claims of the existing literature. We find that 
some of the assertions of the conventional wisdom stand, but others do not. In particular, aggre-
gate data confirm the anecdotal findings of previous authors that German firms are far more re-
luctant to engage in industrial action, in particular, lockouts. They also show, however, contrary 
to the stylized claims of the conventional wisdom, that real compensation growth has been flag-
ging in Germany and productivity developments have been mixed. Our alternative explanation 
is both simpler and consistent with the data. Large firms have still been getting the labor quies-
cence and relative wage restraint that they wanted from employers-association membership. In 
contrast, the deceleration of productivity growth in Germany, which manifested in the 1980s, 
made it far more difficult for SMEs to stay in employers associations and remain profitable. So, 
small firms increasingly shirked membership. 
 
 In order to assess the merit of our claims versus those of others regarding the causes and 
consequences of change within German employers associations, it is essential first to understand 
the profile of German employers associations as well as their economic, legal and political en-
vironment. The following section provides this context. 
 
 
3. A Profile of German Employers Associations 
 
Unlike most countries, Germany has three types of business associations, which since the 
Second World War have maintained a strict division of labor: employers associations (Arbeit-
geberverbände), trade associations (Industrieverbände), and chambers of industry and commerce 
(Industrie- und Handelskammer). Employers associations specialize in the fields of collective bar-
gaining, labor law and social legislation. Trade associations focus on business law, marketing 
abroad, product and process regulation, subsidies, trade and tax policy. The chambers of indus-
try and commerce coordinate training and provide many of the services that better business 
bureaus perform in the United States. So, it is important to remember that German employers 
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associations are not operating alone. They are specialized organizations that provide a subset of 
services relating to employment and coexist (mostly harmoniously) along side two other types of 
business associations (Burgmer 1999; and Weber 1977). 
 
 The structure and approach of German employers associations have evolved significantly 
since they were founded at the end of the nineteenth century. German firms established employ-
ers associations initially as purely anti-union organizations (“Gegenverbände”). Their sole mission 
was to help firms keep out trade unions (Leckebusch 1966). The early German employers asso-
ciations did not engage in collective bargaining. They instead assembled and distributed multi-
firm “blacklists” of pro-union workers and helped to coordinate lockouts to crush strikes. Early 
German employers associations also maintained discipline among the ranks by fining members 
that poached business away from striking firms or that hired workers on strike elsewhere. Coor-
dinating strategy and tactics through employers associations gave German firms more power in 
the labor market, but it also contributed to centralizing and to routinizing industrial relations by 
taking decisions away from individual firms and placing them under the purview of collective 
actors (Hartwich 1967; and Knips 1996: 101). 
 
 During and after the First World War, trade unions gained more rights. Employers asso-
ciations adjusted in response, taking on a number of new tasks, including political lobbying and 
regional collective bargaining at the sectoral level. Some German employers associations also 
continued to help firms avoid unions during the interwar years. The National Socialists, after 
coming to power in the 1933, gradually stripped employers associations of autonomy, reducing 
them to subordinate bodies under the Nazi state. After the Second World War, German business 
gradually reconstructed a new network of business associations that can largely to resemble a 
streamlined version of the interwar structures. The legacy of business collaboration and trade 
union suppression under National Socialism tainted union avoidance as a tactic. The new “basic 
law,” which served as Germany’s constitution, protected the right to organize. Court rulings and 
legislation promoted autonomous collective bargaining between trade unions and employers as-
sociations. As a result, employers associations focused on collective bargaining and no longer as-
sisted member firms in union avoidance (Braunthal 1965; Erdmann 1966; Moser 1990). 
 
There are almost 1,000 employers associations in Germany today, most of them regional 
organizations covering a single sector. The vast majority of these belong to the national federation 
for their sector, such as the General Association of Metal-Industry Employers associations 
(Gesamtverband der metallindustriellen Arbeitgeberverbände, Gesamtmetall) or the Federal Employers 
association of the Chemical Industry (Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie, BAVC). Fifty-four sectoral 
federations belong to the peak association of employers associations, the Federal Organization of 
German Employers associations (Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA). The 
internal structure of employers associations has resembled that of the unions. The collective bar-
gaining department has traditionally been the most important. Other departments typically in-
clude international relations, labor law, media relations, research, personnel policy, social policy 
and training. Employers associations are relatively small. The staff of most regional employers as-
sociations and sectoral federations ranges between two and twenty. Trade unions have many 
times that number (Plumpe 1996). 
 
 A certain degree of distrust has always characterized the relationship between the man-
agement of employers associations and member companies; it may be (at least in part) simply an 
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inevitable product of any principal-agent relationship. To minimize distrust, employers associa-
tions use a “dual” leadership structure consisting of a board of directors (Vorstand) and a man-
aging director (Geschäftsführer). The board of directors sets the policies of an employers associa-
tion. Firms elect the board of directors from among their ranks, ensuring that board decisions 
have a maximum degree of legitimacy. Great care is taken to make certain that representation is 
achieved in terms of size, specialty and region. Board members are not paid, underscoring the 
notion that sitting on the employers association board is a form of service to the business commu-
nity (Traxler 1986: 31). 
 
Recruitment is rarely an easy task for any membership-based organization and employers 
associations are no exception. Employers associations confront organizational challenges that 
trade unions do not. The membership of employers associations is extremely heterogeneous, 
ranging from small enterprises to transnational giants. As a result, the objectives and resources of 
member firms vary widely. Many members of employers associations are highly intertwined 
economically. Some are economic competitors; many buy from or sell to other association mem-
bers. Nonetheless, employers-association members place a high value on preserving autonomy. 
These vast differences in the size, resources and objectives of member firms make it difficult for 
employers associations to reach common positions and to pursue them with consistency and 
discipline. Economic hard times and ideological differences accentuate the divisions. 
 
 Employers-association officials have learned to attract and to retain heterogeneous firms 
by providing selective incentives. Selective incentives include legal services, personnel advice, 
strike insurance and lobbying for member firms. Membership in employers associations has also 
provided individual employers with an invaluable social network for finding and keeping busi-
ness. These selective incentives have traditionally helped employers associations both to bind 
companies closer to the associations and to strengthen the associations’ hand vis-à-vis individual 
member firms. The most important single “product” that German employers associations have 
traditionally provided is the regionwide sectoral collective bargaining agreement (Flächentarif-
vertrag, FTV). FTVs reduce transaction costs for individual firms by eliminating the need to retain 
staff skilled in labor negotiations. They also have reshaped the German labor market by damp-
ening competition on the basis of labor costs within sectors (Traxler 1986: 174). 
 
 An FTV is only effective when it covers firms that account for the preponderance of em-
ployment under its jurisdiction. The degree of coverage, which is known by the technical term 
“density” in industrial relations circles, therefore provides us with an assessment of the power of 
employers associations. It serves as the dependent variable for most investigations of German 
employers associations, including this one. The following section discusses density trends in 
Germany. 
 
3.1. German Employers Association Density 
 
 An important indicator of the influence of the employers associations on labor-market 
policy is density in terms of employment (i.e., the share of the labor force that works for enter-
prises that are members of employers associations). Unfortunately, these data are not readily 
available for the whole economy. Only one sectoral federation of employers associations, 
Gesamtmetall, has regularly released information about its membership. Scholars have tradition-
ally used the data from the metals sector to gauge trends in employers association density for the 
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economy as a whole. This measure is by no means perfect. Still, a good case can be made for 
using the data from the metal-industry employers associations as a surrogate because the sector 
remains at the heart of the German economy, and it has a broad mix of firms ranging from small 
shops to transnational giants. A comparison by Völkl (2002) of employers associations across sec-
tors supports this practice. It finds variation in the membership trends of employers associations 
across sectors, but places the metal industry in a middle range. 
 
 Density gauges the coverage of German employers associations. Employment density 
measures the share of employees at member firms of employers associations as a percentage of 
total employment. Before German unification, density in terms of employment of the western 
Germany metals industry remained remarkably stable, fluctuating only within a few percentage 
points of 75 percent over the twenty-five years for which we have data (see figure 1). Two trends 
in pre-unification density data stand out. First, employers association density slopes upward 
slightly for ten years starting in 1974 and begins to fall off after the first contracts that instituted 




Employment density in the western associations fell by almost twenty percentage points, 
from 77.4 percent in 1984 to 57.6 percent in 2004. The decline in eastern Germany has been even 
more dramatic. In 1991, employment density of the eastern employers associations amounted to 
65.7 percent. This figure was not that different from western density at the time, which was 71.6 
percent, but a gap quickly opened up. In 1995, the employment density of the eastern German 
Figure 1: German Metals Industry Employers' Association Density 
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metals sector had fallen below 50 percent; in 1997, it slipped below 40 percent; in 2000 it dropped 
below 30 percent; and by 2004, it had reached 18.1 percent. 
 
 A cyclical explanation can be ruled out; the data for both eastern and western Germany 
show a steady decline independent of cyclical economic developments (Schroeder and Ruppert 
1996). The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) has undertaken a survey of density in 
terms of employment for employers associations in all manufacturing sectors of eastern Ger-
many. These data track closely with those for the metals sector. DIW found employment densities 
of 76 percent at the end of 1993, 45 percent in early 1998 and 34 percent in the middle of 2000 (ein-
blick, 4 December 2001). 
 
 What has been the impact of the declining density of German employers associations? Re-
gionwide collective bargaining agreements determine compensation for a significantly smaller 
share of German employees today than they did thirty years ago. Between the 1970s and 1995, the 
coverage of regionwide collective agreements in western Germany fell from roughly 80 to 72 per-
cent of all employees. Since 1995, the slide has continued. By 2003, regionwide contracts set com-
pensation for only 62 percent of the western workforce (Institut für Arbeit und Berufsforschung, 
various). 
 
 Some firms that have left their sector’s employers association have negotiated single-firm 
contract with a trade union, which are known as “house” agreements in Germany. The unions 
typically take great pains to ensure that the contents of a house contract are by and large the same 
as the regionwide agreement. Still, managers at some enterprises prefer house agreements for 
several reasons. House agreements can be tailored at the margins to match a firm’s specific needs. 
Firms with house agreements do not have to pay employers association dues and are not drag-
ged into industrial disputes over a regionwide contract. A house agreement also has inherent dis-
advantages. Firms face unions alone in collective bargaining. They must undertake negotiations 
themselves and have no strike insurance (Schroeder 1995). Although the number of house agree-
ments has increased markedly since 1990, the share of employees covered by them in western 
Germany has actually waned, falling from 10.4 to 8 percent between 1995 and 2003, and has re-
mained roughly constant in eastern Germany. So, one cannot conclude that house contracts have 
filled the void created by the decline in coverage of regionwide agreements. 
 
 Combining the data on regionwide and house collective agreements shows that the reach 
of collective bargaining in western Germany has slipped from approximately 90 percent of the 
workforce during the heyday of the 1970s to 70 percent today. Coverage still remains relatively 
even in western Germany. In most regions and sectors, a majority of the employees are essen-
tially under the same collective agreement. An exception in western Germany is business ser-
vices. Coverage in this sector has dropped to 35 percent of the workforce (Ellguth and Kohaut 
2004). 
 
 The eastern German record resembles the west, but the swing has been more pronounced. 
The coverage of regionwide agreements has shrunk faster and farther. In the first few years after 
German unification in 1990, regionwide agreements set compensation for roughly four fifths of 
eastern German employees, just as they had in western Germany up to the early 1980s. The firms 
under the control of the Treuhandanstalt (THA, Trust Holding Agency), which was a public entity 
established to manage the economic assets of the former German Democratic Republic until they 
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were sold off, routinely joined employers associations. The THA liquidated most of its holdings 
within five years. Many of the new private owners failed to maintain memberships in employers 
associations. As a result, the share of the eastern German labor force covered by a regionwide 
collective agreement fell to 56.2 by 1996. This trend continued. In 2003, regionwide contracts 
determined wages and benefits for only 43 percent of all eastern German employees. 
 
 The share of employees covered by house agreements has always been higher in eastern 
Germany. In 1996, this figure amounted to 17.2 percent. By 2003, however, it had fallen to 11 per-
cent, despite an increase in the actual number of contracts. Between 1996 and 2003, the combined 
coverage of regionwide and house agreements in eastern Germany fell from 73.4 to 54 percent. 
Most sectors of the eastern German economy do not have coverage that surpasses fifty percent, 
which means they are not eligible to apply for AVEs. Only banking, communication, energy, 
insurance, mining, transportation and public services exceed the threshold. 
 
 Membership declines among employers associations have resulted in German employers 
associations losing their capacity to carry out their core mission, namely, the determination of 
compensation in the labor market. In both eastern and western Germany, the percentage of 
wages set through collective bargaining has fallen by roughly twenty percentage points from the 
peak level. Why have these declines taken place? 
 
 
4. Why Has German Employers Association Density Declined? 
 
 Thelen and Wijnbergen claim that acceleration in the growth of compensation starting in 
the 1980s has been the cause of the declining density of German employers associations. An ex-
amination of compensation trends shows the opposite, however. Mean annual change in real 
hourly income in both the German economy as a whole and in the western German metalwork-
ing sector has grown smaller in each successive decade since the 1960s (see table 1). As a result, 
personnel costs have progressively become relatively easier for firms to bear, not harder. Western 
German personnel costs calculated as a percentage of total sales have declined from 33.5 percent 
in 1974 to 22.2 percent in 2004. Eastern German labor costs fell even farther, dropping from the 
equivalent of 40.9 percent of total sales in 1992 to 20.9 percent in 2004 (Gesamtmetall). Something 
else besides a surge in labor costs must be causing the decline in employment density of German 
employers associations. 
 
Table 1: Mean Annual Change in Real Hourly Income
Period Germany Western Metalworking 
1961-1970 5.9% 5.9% 
1970-1980 3.6% 3.7% 
1980-1990 1.5% 1.7% 
1990-2000 1.3%* 1.5% 
2000-2004 0.6% 0.6% 
* United Germany as of 1991. 
Sources:  Gesamtmetall and OECD Main Economic 
Indicators 
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 Productivity data provide a clue, although the developments are not uniform. For the 
German economy as a whole, the pattern of productivity growth tracks with that of income, 
which is to be expected. Productivity grows over the last forty-five years, but at an increasingly 
slower pace (Table 2). The 1990-2000 period stands out as a marginal exception, but it can easily 
be explained by the one-time surge in eastern German productivity immediately following Ger-
man unification. The dominant trend of decelerating productivity growth for Germany resumes 
in the subsequent period. The pattern of productivity growth differs in the metalworking sector, 
however. Metalworking productivity decelerates along with the national pattern (although at a 
slightly higher average rate) during the 1980s (table 2), but breaks with the national trend there-
after. Metalworking productivity growth rebounds dramatically in the 1990-2000 period and then 
settles in the subsequent period at a rate substantially higher than productivity growth for Ger-
many as a whole (3.9 percent vs. 1.5 percent). 
 
Table 2: Mean Annual Change in 
Real Hourly Productivity: Germany 
(Productivity = GDP per hour worked))
Time Period Germany Metalworking
1960-1970 4.8%  
1970-1980 3.7% 4.4% 
1980-1990 2.4% 2.9% 
1990-2000 2.5%* 5.1%* 
2000-2004 1.5% 3.9% 
* United Germany as of 1991. 
Sources:  Gesamtmetall and 
OECD Productivity Data Base. 
 
 The recent acceleration in productivity combined moderation of income growth in the 
metalworking sector explain why labor costs as a percentage of total sales have dropped precipi-
tously, particularly over the last decade. In other words, the data show that cost pressures owing 
to wages have become increasingly less severe in recent years. The picture for the German econ-
omy as a whole is neutral regarding cost pressures owing to labor. Productivity increases have 
tailed off, but so has income growth. The data clearly demonstrate that the causal chain theorized 
by the conventional wisdom does not exist in practice. What then has caused the decline in em-
ployer association density? 
 
4.1. Alternative Explanations for the Decline in German Employers Association Density 
 
 A multitude of explanations have been proffered for the decline in employers association 
density. Some of the broader explanations, such as generational change, can be dismissed out of 
hand because they cannot explain the divergence between large and small enterprises in the pro-
pensity to belong to an employers’ association. Three potential explanations do exist that are con-
sistent with the data: (1) divisive pressure of greater global competition on German manufac-
turing, (2) changes in firm size, and (3) poor provision of employers association services to SMEs. 
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4.1.1. Divisive Pressure of Greater Global Competition on German Manufacturing 
 
 Germany’s original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) – that is, the predominantly large 
firms that assemble manufactured goods – first began to face significant competition from East 
Asia at home and in third-country markets in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They responded by 
borrowing production techniques from Japan – such as just-in-time parts delivery and “continu-
ous improvement” (kanban) – that put unprecedented quality and price pressures on their parts 
suppliers (Silvia 1988). This trend hit small suppliers particularly hard because most did not have 
the depth to adjust easily. Small suppliers began to look for ways to cut costs that were previous-
ly unthinkable; this included dropping membership in employers associations. 
 
 The recession of the early 1990s led to a ratcheting up the pressure on suppliers by several 
notches. One man came to symbolize this development: Volkswagen’s chief of parts purchasing, 
José Ignacio López de Arriortua. Ignacio López demanded that all suppliers cut their prices by at 
least 25 percent. Any firms failing to comply would lose Volkswagen’s business. This aggressive 
approach became known in Germany as the “López effect.” The López effect spread quickly 
throughout the German manufacturing sector, but it remained especially severe in the automo-
bile industry. Parts suppliers complain that a second wave of across-the-board double digit price 
cuts is currently underway. As a result, the return on productivity improvements in the auto 
parts sector has gone primarily into cost cutting rather than profits. Profitability in terms of sales 
among German automobile parts suppliers has deteriorated over the decades. Lately parts sup-
plier profitability has failed to break the five-percent mark. This pressure on parts suppliers has 
bifurcated the German automobile industry. The return on investment for the OEMs has been 
double that of the suppliers and the gap between the two has continued to widen (Direkt, 31 
March 2004; A.T. Kearney 2002; Ernst and Young 2003; Lay and Wallmeier 1999; and Kinkel and 
Lay 2004; Roth 2002). 
 
 The deterioration of the economic environment for German supplier firms because OEMs 
greatly intensified cost and quality pressures in the wake of globalization is the main explanation 
for the overall decline of membership in German employers associations and the disproportion-
ately large drop in SME density. The timing is consistent with this explanation and the scope of 
the pressure is by far the largest of all potential explanations. The explanation is also in step with 
the data on wages, productivity and the pattern of membership loss (Silvia 1999). 
 
 Secondary explanations help to account for some dimensions of declining density in Ger-
man employers associations that the divisive pressures of globalization on German manufactur-
ing alone cannot. Let us now turn to these. 
 
4.1.2. Changes in Firm Size 
 
 The changing demographics of German business also helps to account for the decline in 
employers associations association density throughout Germany, but it is a particularly impor-
tant explanation for the disproportionately large decline in eastern Germany. Smaller firms have 
always had a lower propensity to join employers associations, so a decline in median firm size 
would reduce density in terms of employment. OECD and German national data on firm size 
reveal a shift toward smaller firms. Employment data also reflect the shift. From 1991 to 1999, net 
employment at firms with between twenty and ninety-nine employees expanded by 900,000, but 
at firms employing 100 or more the net number of jobs fell by 1.8 million (OECD 2002). The dis-
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mantling of and privatization of the eastern German economy during the 1990s reduced the pro-
portion of the workforce employed at large workplaces far below that of western Germany. This 
is precisely when employers association density in terms of employment fell precipitously in 
eastern Germany (see figure 1). One might think that the divergence between eastern and 
western employers association densities would be the product of the very different economic and 
historical trajectories of the two regions, but empirical analysis shows otherwise. Schroeder and 
Ruppert (1996) found that eastern and western German firms of the same size had the same pro-
pensity to join employers associations. In other words, the gap in firm density between eastern 
and western Germany is the product of the dearth of large workplaces in the east rather than dif-
ferences in acculturation or conditions on the ground (Schroeder 2000).  
 
4.1.3. Poor Provision of Employer-association Services to SMEs 
 
  Case studies and interviews show a belief among rising numbers of owners and manag-
ers of small businesses that employers associations are not sufficiently considering the specific 
interests of SMEs, particularly in comparison to the concerns of the larger members (e.g., Max-
Planck-Institut 2002). Research has not yet indicated whether this belief is simply a manifestation 
of divisive pressure of greater global competition on German manufacturing (which was dis-
cussed above), or service provision has actually deteriorated, or SMEs are asking for new services 
that the employers associations have been slow to provide. 
 
 It is important at this juncture to distinguish briefly between our explanation and the 
claims of the conventional wisdom for the decline of German employers associations, since they 
are subtle yet significant. The conventional explanation asserts that German trade unions have 
exploited a greater sensitivity and vulnerability of larger transnational firms that is a product of 
greater global competition to extract additional monopoly rents from German firms. Large com-
panies have been able to adjust relatively easily, but the SMEs have not, prompting them to flee 
employers associations in an effort to cut costs. The weakness of this explanation is that it is in-
consistent with the data on wage increases, which have grown more moderate over time and thus 
show no evidence of greater rents accruing to union members. Our explanation also begins with 
greater global competition, but it is more direct. Large internationally active firms have shifted 
costs onto SMEs as a part of their response to greater global competition. Increasing numbers of 
SMEs have reacted by fleeing employers associations. The unions are not beneficiaries of these de-
velopments. To the contrary, they have found their ability to advance wages diminished. 
 
 The changing environment does raise an additional question, which we have yet to ad-
dress: how have German employers associations responded to membership decline and the new, 
challenging demands of individual firms? The next section provides an overview. 
 
  What has been the impact of these trends? Declining membership and the erosion in the 
coverage of collective bargaining since the 1980s have contributed to a deterioration in solidarity 
among employers and a discarding of the German employers associations’ most potent weapon 
in industrial disputes: the lockout. 
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5. The Impact of Declining German Employes Association Density 
 
 The data on compensation presented above show that declining density has not thus far 
weakened the hand of German employers associations in collective bargaining, but there is 
strong evidence that declining density has effectively removed perhaps one of the most contro-
versial tactics from the repertoire of German employers, namely, the lockout. The lockout has a 
long tradition in German industrial relations. Employers and their associations frequently re-
sorted to lockouts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regularly in order to raise the 
cost of strikes for workers and their unions. At times, the lockout was used to break unions. 
 
 The Nazis eliminated autonomous collective bargaining, so there was no need to use lock-
outs. Employers were slow to revive the controversial tactic in the immediate postwar years (see 
table 3) in large part because collaboration with Nazism had tarnished the reputation of German 
business and the onset of the Cold War led many in the business community to seek reconcilia-
tion with organized labor in order to demonstrate that a mixed capitalist economy was superior 
to Soviet-style central planning. In the early 1960s, however, aggressive new leaders among the 
ranks of the employers revived the lockout as a weapon in industrial disputes. Employers associ-
ations began to expel firms that refused to participate in lockouts. Expulsion from an employers 
association was a serious punishment in the 1960s. It deprived an expelled employer of participa-
tion in the association’s collective bargaining deliberations, strike insurance, opportunities to 
serve on tripartite quasi-governmental bodies and assistance when dealing with banks, other 
businesses and government officials. Expelled employers were also shunned in the business 
community (Noé 1970: 315). The get-tough policy yielded results. From 1960 to 1969, for every 
100 striking workers, 37.8 were locked out; and for every 100 workdays lost because workers 
were on strike, 43.4 were lost because workers were locked out. Employers continued to use the 
lockout regularly during the 1970s and 1980s. The percentage of locked-out employees to strikers 
began to wane during the 1980s, but the ratio of lost days owing to lockouts vs. strikes remained 
high, reaching 44.3 percent. 
 
 During the 1980s, leading German firms began to adopt new manufacturing methods im-
ported principally from Japan, such as just-in-time parts delivery and lean production, in re-
Table 3:  Use of the Lock-out in German Industrial Relations 






Locked Out as 
a Percentage of
Total Striking 
and Locked  
Out Employees
Working Days Lost 











1950-59 1,395,898   38,238 2.7%   9,831,075    791,183 8.05%
1960-69    815,967 308,717 37.83%   3,157,249 1,371,377 43.44%
1970-79 1,982,781 679,278 34.26% 11,647,753 6,224,646 53.44%
1980-89 1,395,903 172,119 12.33%   6,098,410 2,698,875 44.26%
1990-99 2,151,507        275 0.01%   3,378,265        2,591 0.08%
 
*Actual participating and affected workers and actual lost working days without double counting. 
Source: Statistitisches Bundesamt; Bundesagentur für Arbeit. Authors’ calculations.  
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sponse to intensifying international competition. The new techniques cut costs and enhanced 
quality, but they simultaneously increased the speed and intensity of a strike’s impact on produc-
tion. As quality became ever more crucial to success in international markets, German workplace 
managers increasingly came to value a close, cooperative relationship with their employees. 
Nothing poisoned plant relations more than a lockout. Consequently, local managers increasing-
ly began to resist demands by their employers associations to lock out employees. On the other 
side of the coin, the value of joining an employers association had fallen since the 1960s. Firms 
were increasingly relying on in-house personnel service and legal advice. Direct connections with 
politicians and other businesses had become far more common. Shunning lost much of its impact, 
because most local business communities had become far less close knit (Silvia 1988). 
 
 Since many German firms were already questioning the value of membership in an em-
ployers association, the threat of expulsion lost much of its disciplinary power. As a result, in the 
1990s employers associations all but abandoned the lockout. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
German employers locked out at least 100,000 employees (see table 1). German firms only locked 
out 275 workers during the entire decade of the 1990s, even though the number of strikers for the 
decade exceeded two million, which was an all-time high. The share of locked out employees cal-
culated against the total number of striking and locked out employees fell to an astounding 0.01 
percent. Days lost owing to lockouts as a percentage of lost days due to strikes and lockouts 
dropped to an equally astounding 0.08 percent. 
 
 The terrain for German employers associations has shifted considerably. Declining den-
sity and the loss of one of the traditionally most powerful weapons in their arsenal poses an un-
precedented change to their place in the German economy. How have they responded? 
  
 
6. Employers Association Responses 
 
 German employers associations have reacted to falling membership the way any business 
would to declining sales. They have been altering their existing product to bring it more into line 
with perceived customer needs and developing new offerings. Organizational survival ultimately 
trumps unswerving fealty to past practice, although vested interests both inside and outside of 
the associations may resist even sound reforms for particularistic reasons. On the other hand, 
rash or ill-conceived innovations can even hasten decline, because they alienate existing members 
while failing to attract new ones. Experimentation by German employers associations began in-
crementally, but it has accelerated in recent years, since the smaller steps have not staunched 
membership loss. 
 
6.1. Hardship and Opening Clauses 
 
 Starting in the 1990s, German employers associations have striven at the behest of their 
members to make regionwide collective agreements more flexible, departing from a “one size fits 
all” approach. Specifically, many employers associations have successfully inserted “opening 
clauses” (Öffnungsklauseln) and “hardship clauses” (Härtefallklauseln or Härteklauseln) into collec-
tive agreements to provide some flexibility at the level of the workplace for the determination of 
compensation. The differences between opening and hardship clauses are slight. Many do not 
use the terms consistently, which adds to the confusion. Both are types of escape clauses that, 
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when included in a collective agreement, give the manager and works council at an individual 
workplace the option of developing abrogations from a regionwide collective agreement. 
 
 Hardship clauses are specifically intended for firms experiencing serious economic diffi-
culty. To qualify for a hardship clause, however, a firm must open its books completely. As a 
rule, hardship clauses require both the employers association and the trade union with jurisdic-
tion over the workplace in question to ratify any agreement reached by workplace management 
and the works council before it can go into effect. Firms that are only temporarily experiencing 
difficulties but are otherwise sound are the ones most likely to receive approval to use a hardship 
clause at one or more workplaces. In contrast, the collective bargaining parties usually do not ap-
prove contractual abrogations for firms that are performing so badly that even cuts in compensa-
tion will not save them because propping up hopeless enterprises can force other companies on 
the margins out of business. 
 
 Opening clauses are more general and are not just for firms in economic trouble. The prin-
cipal purpose of opening clauses is to increase flexibility in the German labor market. Firms wish-
ing to invoke an opening clause usually must provide some economic justification, but they typi-
cally do not have to open their books. Most opening clauses also require the collective bargaining 
parties to ratify an abrogation before it can go into effect, but a few do not. The majority of open-
ing clauses in current contracts permit greater flexibility in weekly working time, or temporary 
reductions in wages and benefits either for new hires to promote employment, or for the whole 
workforce to avoid layoffs. Opening clauses may also be used to permit practices such as 
performance-based pay and lower compensation scales for small enterprises (Bundesministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2004). 
 
 Hardship and opening clauses have spread relatively quickly to collective agreements 
throughout the German economy, and workplaces are using them. Bispinck and Schulten (2003) 
estimate that one third of all workplaces in the private sector have individual agreements that di-
verge from the regionwide contract. Most employers have nonetheless found escape clauses to be 
insufficient because they are intended for firms in economic distress. As a result, employers asso-
ciations have worked on additional alternatives. 
 
6.2. Quick Notice 
 
 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing numbers of managers from firms leaving em-
ployers associations said they were doing so because they feared getting trapped in a bad con-
tract. German law requires any company that leaves an employers association continue to adhere 
to all contracts signed by that association when the company was still a member for the duration 
of those contracts. For example, if an employers association approved a two-year wage agree-
ment and a member firm quit the association on the following day, the member firm would still 
be legally obligated to pay the contractual rates for the two years that the contract is in force, even 
though the firm is no longer a member of the employers association, because it was still a mem-
ber on the day the contract was ratified. Managers particularly worried about the cost of a settle-
ment left their employers association when a union put a high opening offer on the table, even 
though the final agreement amount to only a small fraction of the initial demand.  
 
 In response, a few employers associations have begun to offer something called “quick 
notice.”  Before the introduction of quick notice, it took several weeks at a minimum for a firm to 
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leave an employers association. Employers associations with quick notice allow member firms to 
leave the association immediately whenever they wish, simply by sending a postmarked letter to 
that effect to the association. This way, nervous managers are able to let negotiations unfold con-
siderably farther without fear of being locked into an expensive contract. In many instances, 
firms can even withdraw during the period after a provisional agreement has been reached, but 
before the employers association has officially ratified it, because the agreement is not yet legally 
binding. Quick notice has alleviated some of the anxiety of nervous managers about being trap-
ped in a bad contract, but it has not arrested the employers associations’ membership slide. Few 
of the firms that have the option of using quick notice have actually used it and the membership 
declines of employers associations that have quick notice are not noticeably less than those that 
do. 
 
6.3. OT Membership 
 
 A more radical response by employers associations to dissatisfaction and flight has been 
to offer a whole new form of affiliation called membership “without collective bargaining ties” 
(in German, ohne Tarifbindung, or OT). OT members are not involved in the collective bargaining 
activities of their employers association, but may avail themselves of the association’s legal, lob-
bying and personnel services. OT members are not obliged to pay the wages and benefits spelled 
out in the regional collective agreement of their employers association. Unlike full members, 
however, OT members are not shielded from union efforts to obtain a house collective agreement 
directly from them, which could include a strike. OT members typically pay lower dues, but are 
not eligible to collect strike insurance from an employers association. 
 
 OT membership is widespread in the metals, plastics, textiles and woodworking indus-
tries. It is particularly popular among small firms. Slightly more than one-quarter of the member 
firms in the metalworking industry have an OT membership. These firms employ one tenth of 
the workers in the sector. Fully one third of the 1,500 firms in textile employers associations are 
OT members. In eastern Germany, a majority of the members in many regional employers asso-
ciations have OT status (Handelsblatt, 30 September 2004). 
 
 OT membership accomplishes several objectives for employers associations. It provides 
an alternative to quitting an employers association for disgruntled members, particularly those 
firms upset by the results of a specific collective agreement or fearful of an upcoming bargaining 
round. OT membership permits the employers-association officials to stay in touch with the man-
agers of firms that otherwise would have left altogether and to continue to collect at least some 
dues from them. The existence of the OT option also gives employers associations more leverage 
in collective negotiations, because they can argue that a costly settlement will lead more firms to 
switch to OT membership. 
 
 Regional affiliates of metal-industry employers associations in Baden-Württemberg, 
Hesse and eastern Germany pioneered OT membership in the late 1990s as an alternative to full 
membership. They did so with reluctance and even embarrassment. For decades, the principal 
task of employers associations has been negotiating regionwide collective bargaining contracts. 
The resort to OT membership could be perceived as an admission of failure. It remains to be seen 
whether a tipping point exists at which flight out of full membership undermines the viability of 
the regionwide collective agreements that cover full members in German employers associations. 
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OT membership, moreover, is not without its risks for employers associations. It is far from cer-
tain that employers associations would survive if bargaining shifted to the company level, be-
cause the main reason most individual firms have traditionally joined an employers association – 
the provision of collective security in industrial disputes – would disappear. A transition to OT 
membership could cost the employers association a great deal. Even if only half of the current 
membership in terms of employment in an individual German employers association changed 
their memberships to the OT variety, many privileges and protections provided under German 
labor law would fall away. Employers association could also lose their tax-exempt status if a ma-
jority of firms joined as OT members, because the primary mission of the associations would be 
personnel consulting rather than collective bargaining. Employers associations are nonetheless 
attracted to this new form of organization because it may be the key to their survival in a bifur-
cated economic environment. 
 
 The employers associations in the textile and woodworking sectors were the first to per-
mit OT memberships. Small employers comprise a much larger share of the membership in these 
sectors. As a result, recruitment and retention of members has always been more challenging. 
The intensification of transnational competition since the 1970s took a heavy toll on membership 
in the two sectors. Desperate officials in the two associations relented and decided to permit OT 
membership (Schroeder 1999).  
 
 Initially, the peak confederation in the metalworking sector, Gesamtmetall, also reluctant-
ly tolerated OT membership arrangements among its regional affiliates primarily because it was 
not in a strong enough position to mete out effective discipline to stop it. This changed in 2005 
when Gesamtmetall’s leadership decided fully to embrace OT membership. In March of that 
year, Gesamtmetall picked a 39-year-old lawyer who had been chief of personnel at the Knorr 
brake company by the name of Eva Maria Kunstmann to become the new director-general of the 
organization. A month later, Gesamtmetall explicitly sanctioned OT membership as an alterna-
tive to the traditional form. Gesamtmetall adopted a new mission statement announcing this 
transformation explicitly as its first point. At the top of Gesamtmetall’s webpage it currently 
reads, “The Peak Association for Enterprises bound and unbound by collective bargaining.”  
 
 None of these measures has so far stopped the slide of German employers’ associations. 
They nonetheless represent a reconstruction of German capitalism that has implications for how 
we understand the political economy of high-income countries. 
 
 
7. Implications of Findings for Varieties of Capitalism Literature 
 
 The results of this research also has implications for the “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) lit-
erature. The VoC school emphasizes the differences in national models of capitalism, but ironi-
cally underplays heterogeneity within individual countries (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001). At times 
some VoC authors stress the necessity of retaining all of the components within a nationalist 
model with a fervor that borders on functionalism. Recent developments in the German case 
show increasing fragmentation between manufacturers and suppliers. German manufacturers 
have been able to retain much of the so-called German model. They have only been able to do so, 
however, by forcing parts suppliers to abandon large pieces of it. Similar gulfs have opened up 
within the German economy between services and manufacturing, and between the public and 
private sectors, resulting in variety within the varieties of capitalism. The coordination of capi-
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talism reached unprecedented levels in some sectors, such as the chemical industry, whereas it 
has broken down in others, such as construction, depending on economic conditions and political 
economic dynamics within individual sectors. Other industries, such as metalworking, have di-
vides within the sectors themselves. 
 
 This increasing heterogeneity makes the task of interest groups exceedingly problematic 
because it has become increasingly difficult to find a common denominator among members. 
Some, such as Gesamtmetall and the employers associations in the textile and woodworking in-
dustries, are experimenting with two-tiered memberships. It remains too soon to tell whether this 
approach (or any other) will successfully bridge the gaps that have opened up. Increasing hetero-
geneity also poses a challenge to the VoC scholars, because many of their studies identify distinct 
homogeneous national systems of economic regulation as the principal explanation for the rise 
and persistence of variation among national “models” of capitalism. The VoC school cannot ac-
count for how fragmentation within a single national regulatory framework could take place, yet 





 The conventional wisdom on German employers associations correctly describes member-
ship developments within German employers associations. Membership density is declining pri-
marily because small firms are increasingly shirking membership. The conventional view mis-
specifies the cause. Its authors claim that German trade unions have been taking advantage of the 
greater vulnerability of German firms that are more deeply engaged internationally to extract ad-
ditional monopoly rents. Evidence does not support this assertion, however. German wage in-
creases have become increasingly moderate over successive decades.  
 
 Our evidence shows that German multinational enterprises have been increasingly ag-
gressive in shifting costs onto the smaller domestic suppliers in order to strengthen their position 
in international markets. As a result, ever larger numbers of SMEs have fled employers associa-
tions to reduce costs. German trade unions are neither the motor nor a beneficiary of these devel-
opments. They have instead weakened organized labor’s collective bargaining clout.  
 
 The decision of growing numbers of German employers associations to accept multiple 
forms of membership, including some that do not include collective bargaining, demonstrates a 
rise fragmentation and heterogeneity within the German economy. The VoC school, which relies 
heavily on distinct national regimes of accumulation to explain the persistence of distinct national 
models of capitalism, cannot account for the fragmentation. In other words, we are beginning to 
see increasing variety within national varieties of capitalism. An explanation for the rise of frag-
mentation supported by evidence appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research. 
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